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Abstract
In this paper, we present a way to translate the metainferences of a mixed metainferential
system into formulae of an extended-language system, called its associated σ-system. To do
this, the σ-system will contain new operators (one for each satisfaction standard), called the
σ operators, which represent the notions of "belonging to a (given) satisfaction standard".
We first prove, in a model-theoretic way, that these translations preserve (in)validity. That
is, that a metainference is valid in the base system if and only if its translation is a tautology
of its corresponding σ-system. We then use these results to obtain other key advantages.
Most interestingly, we provide a recipe for building unlabeled sequent calculi for σ-systems.
We then exemplify this with a σ-system useful for logics of the ST family, and prove
soundness and completeness for it, which indirectly gives us a calculus for the metainferences
of all those mixed systems. Finally, we respond to some possible objections and show how
our σ-framework can shed light on the “obeying” discussion within mixed metainferential
contexts.
1 Introduction
In recent times validity has been extensively studied not only from an inferential perspective,
but also from a metainferential one. That is, interest grew around inferences that have other
inferences as premises and/or conclusions (which may themselves contain inferential compo-
nents). The reasons for this interest are varied. Metainferences have recently come into focus
as a useful way of distinguishing between various substructural solutions to semantic paradoxes
(as shown in [21]), as a new way to characterize a logic (see for example [5]), as a way to analyze
the debate between global and local validity [4], as a toolkit for understanding abstract features
of consequence relations [27]), and as a key for a new version of the collapse argument against
logical pluralism (as [2] shows).1
For example, one traditional characterization of a logic sees it as a dyadic relation between
sets (or multisets/tuples) of formulae. Under that characterization, it was argued that the logic
ST was identical to classical logic (CL), since they validate exactly the same inferences (for
example, see [25], [26] or [11]). However, these two logics validate different sets of metainferences,
metametainferences, and so on. Thus, if a logic is not just thought of as a relation between
inferences, but also between metainferences at all levels (as [5] and [21] suggest), then ST and
CL should not be considered the same logic.
On the other hand, one reason why ST is interesting is that it allows us to preserve all classi-
cally valid inferences, while at the same time being able to incorporate problematic vocabulary,
such as a naive truth predicate (the failure of metainferential transitivity or Cut in ST is part
of the reason why it can do this).
1And it is not implausible to think about metainferences also as a central feature of new solutions to vagueness-
related phenomena.
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From this point of view, taking a metainferential perspective is interesting because it allows
us to get even closer to classical logic, while also being able to retain the problematic vocabulary
in question. For instance, as [21] shows, the system TS/ST validates all classical inferences and
metainferences, while also being able to incorporate a naive truth predicate. This system, how-
ever, will fail to validate some classically valid metametainferences. The system STTS/TSST
can fix this, since it will validate every classical n-level inference up to n = 3, but will fail for
some inferences of level n > 3 (where level 2 inferences are metainferences, level 3 inferences are
meta-metainferences, etc). Generalizing this procedure and taking the union of the resulting
systems, one can obtain what Pailos calls a "fully classical" logic characterized by substructural
means.2 This system will validate every n-level classical (meta)inference, and will also be able
to contain a truth predicate.
In this paper we focus on a subclass of mixed metainferential logics, and provide some
results for them. We will show a way to to collapse all n-level inferences to 0 level (i.e. into
formulae), such that (in)validity is preserved in the translation. To accomplish this, we extend
the language with new satisfaction operators, which will intuitively reflect the notion of "being
satisfied according to a standard" inside the object language. In that way, we will be able to
define systems where (some) formulae will be logically true if and only if the corresponding
n-inference is valid.
This, in turn, will provide several advantages and further results. Most notable is the
following. Metainferential and mixed metainferential logics of this kind have been studied mostly
model-theoretically. The above results will allow us to give standard inferential calculi for
checking the validity of metainferences, for both pure and mixed metainferential systems.
We shall proceed as follows. In section 2, we present some technical preliminaries, which
will be necessary to understand our proposal in the sections that follow. Section 3 model-
theoretically introduces our extended language σ-systems, as well as the apparatus that enables
us to collapse (meta)inferences into formulae of those systems. In section 4, we present a proof
theory for σ-systems in the form of n-sided sequent calculi, exemplified with a particular system
and a proof of soundness and completeness for it. In section 5 we respond to some objections
and consider some additional philosophical payoffs of our approach. Finally, we draw some
conclusions.
2 Technical preliminaries
In this section, we lay out some basic vocabulary and results concerning the kinds of systems
that we will be dealing with, that is, many-valued mixed metainferential systems. Let us explain
what each of these terms refers to.
We begin by fixing some terminology. Let L be a propositional language, such that FOR(L)
is the absolutely free algebra of formulae of L, whose universe we denote by FOR(L). We will let
Γ,∆, and other Greek capital letters represent finite sets of formulae, or sets of (meta)inferences.
We will let context determine which one is relevant. γ, δ, and other lower-case Greek letters
represent the members of Γ, ∆, that is, individual formulae, or (meta)inferences—once again, we
hope context will make clear how they should be understood. We will also use some uppercase
letters, such as A, B, C and D to represent arbitrary formulae.
The next step is to give a formal definition of both inferences and metainferences. Let
INF 0(L) = FOR(L). Then:
Definition 2.1. A (meta)inference of (a finite) level n (for 1 ≤ n < ω) is an ordered pair 〈Γ,∆〉,
where Γ,∆ ⊆ INFn−1(L) (written Γ/n∆). INFn(L) is the set of all metainferences of level n
2Which is equivalent to what Scambler calls, in [28], "the twist logic T".
Australasian Journal of Logic (18:7) 2021, Article no. 3
735
on L.
Thus, for example, INF 1(L) will be the set of regular (level 1) inferences of L, and we refer
to its members using the notation Γ/1∆. Each γ ∈ Γ and δ ∈ ∆ will be a formula in that
case. INF 2(L) will be the set of (level 2) metainferences (written Γ/2∆), where each γ ∈ Γ
and δ ∈ ∆ is a regular inference. More intuitively, a level 2 metainference can be understood
as an inference between regular inferences (while metainferences of level 1 are just traditional
inferences). Analogously, a level n metainference may be interpreted as an inference between
(n− 1)-level (meta)inferences. When the level of a metainference Γ/n∆ is clear by context, we
will more simply write Γ/∆.
As said above, the logics we will be working with are many-valued and mixed. In [10],
Chemlá, Egré and Spector introduce the notions of mixed and impure consequence relations.
We shall say that a consequence relation (for a propositional language L) is mixed if and only
if, for every inference Γ/n∆, ∆ follows from Γ if and only if, for every valuation v, if v(γ) meets
some standard S1 (for all γ ∈ Γ), then v(δ) meets some standard S2 (for some δ ∈ ∆). If
S1 6= S2, then the mixed consequence relation is said to be impure. These notions can be made
more precise with the following definitions.
Definition 2.2. A subset Si of the entire set of truth values V is a 0-level standard (i.e. a
standard for formulae, see below). A pair of (n− 1)-level standards 〈S1, S2〉, which we write as
S1/nS2 (or, more simply, S1/S2 when the level is clear by context), is an n-level standard.
With this in mind, we can formally specify what it is for both a formula and a (meta)inference
to meet some (simple or complex) standard, with the following recursive definition.
Definition 2.3. A 0-level inference (i.e. formula) A is satisfied by a valuation v according to
a 0-level standard Si if and only if v(A) ∈ Si. (Equivalently, one can say that v satisfies A
according to Si). A (meta)inference Γ/n∆ (of any finite level n > 0) is satisfied by a valuation
v according to a standard S1/nS2 if and only if, (if v satisfies every γ ∈ Γ according to S1 then
v satisfies every δ ∈ ∆ according to S2).
For example, take the set of truth values V = {0, 1} and the 0-level standards F = {0} and
T = {1}. The level-1 inference p/q is satisfied according to T/T by the valuation v(p) = 0 and
v(q) = 1, but not by v′(p) = 1 and v′(q) = 0. The first is the case because the antecedent in
the conditional (if v satisfies p according to T then v satisfies q according to T ) is false; in the
second case, the antecedent is true and the consequent false. If we change the standard to F/F
then v′ satisfies the inference while v does not. Similarly, a level-2 metainference (p/q)/2(r/s)
will be satisfied by a valuation v(p) = 1, v(q) = 1, v(r) = 0, v(s) = 1 according to the standard
(T/T )/(T/T ), but not according to the standard (T/T )/(F/F ). The first happens, because
both the antecedent and the consequent in the conditional (if v satisfies p/q according to (T/T )
then v satisfies r/s according to (T/T )) are true (to see this, one needs to apply the definition
of satisfaction recursively in both the antecedent and the consequent). The second does not
because, once again, the antecedent is true and the consequent is false (we leave it as an exercise
to the reader to check that this is so).
Up until now, we have only been speaking of when an n-level standard satisfies an n-level
inference. But the definition can be extended to cover cases where the level of the inference is
either lower or greater than the level of the standard. As is common in the literature, we shall
take a (meta)inference Γ/(n−1)∆ of level n − 1 to be satisfied by the standard X/nY just in
case the n-inference ∅/n(Γ/(n−1)∆) is satisfied by that standard; that is, when the conclusion
standard Y satisfies the inference. Similarly, an n−2 inference Γ/(n−2)∆ will be satisfied by the
n-level standard (X/Y )/n(W/Z) just in case the n inference ∅/n(∅/(n−1)(Γ/(n−2)∆)) is satisfied
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by it; that is, when it is satisfied by Z, the conclusion standard of the conclusion standard.
Ripley (in [27]) calls this "lowering".
For levels greater than n, we simply repeat the standard. A (meta)inference Γ/(n+1)∆ of level
n+1 is satisfied by the n-level standardX/nY if and only if it is satisfied by (X/nY )/n+1(X/nY ).
For an inference of level n + 2 we duplicate this last standard. Ripley (in [27]) calls this
"lifting". In that way, returning to the example above, we can state that both p/p and
((p/p)/2(p/p))/3((p/p)/2(p/p)) are satisfied by the valuation v(p) = 1 according to the level-2
standard T/T .
Once we know what it is for a (meta)inference to meet a standard according to a valuation
(i.e. to be satisfied by it) we can define the mixed system X/Y based on the standard X/Y , in
the following way.
Definition 2.4. If X/nY is an n-level standard, then X/nY is the system in which the
(meta)inference Γ/m∆ (for any arbitrary level m) is valid if and only if every valuation v
satisfies Γ/m∆ according to X/nY .
Returning once again to the previous example, the level-1 inference p/q is invalid in classical
logic CL (i.e. T/T). Although some valuations (for example v(p) = 0 and v(q) = 1) do satisfy
that inference, there is at least one valuation (v′(p) = 1 and v′(q) = 0) that does not.
This way of characterizing the notion of metainferential validity is known as the “local con-
ception of metainferential validity”([14]).3 As it stands, the definition specifies what it takes for
a particular metainference to be valid in a particular logic. Nevertheless, it can—and will—be
used to specify when a metainferential scheme is valid in a logic L. In a nutshell, a scheme is
valid in L if and only if every instance of it is valid.
It will also be useful for later on to define the notion of anti-validity introduced by Scambler
in [28].
Definition 2.5. A (meta)inference Γ/m∆ is anti-valid in the system X/nY if and only no
valuation v satisfies Γ/m∆ according to X/nY .
Before moving on, it will be useful to introduce some mixed 3-valued systems that have
already been extensively studied in the literature, and that we will mention repeatedly below.
Let V be the set of truth values {1, 12 , 0}, and let S = {1} and T = {1,
1
2} be two standards on
that set of truth values (usually referred to as the strict and tolerant standards, respectively).
Using the Strong Kleene truth matrices for the connectives, we can define four systems by
differently combining the premise and conclusion standards.
• The system S/S, commonly known as K3.
• The system S/T, commonly known as ST.
• The system T/S, commonly known as TS.
• The system T/T, commonly known as LP.
Of these, it is interesting to mention that ST and TS are not structural (ST is non-transitive
and TS is non-reflexive). The following two results are also worth mentioning.
3Another relevant notion of metainferential validity is the global one, which is, essentially, preservation of
validity. As [29] proves, both notions coincide for schemes if certain conditions are met—for example, if we have
constants in the language for every truth value. For more about this notion, and the difference between a local
and a global notion of metainferential validity, see [19].
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Fact 2.6 ([18], [25]). ST and classical propositional logic CL—presented with the traditional
bivalent deterministic valuations—have the same set of valid inferences.
Fact 2.7 ([16]). TS has no valid inferences.
Note, however, that ST is not identical to CL for any metainferential level greater than 1.
For example, it fails to validate the metainference (Γ/1∆), (∆/1Π)/2(Γ/1Π), which is valid in
classical logic. TS, on the other hand, even though it does not validate any inferences, will
validate some metainferences (such as (A/1A)/2(A/1A), a form of meta-reflexivity). Finally,
note that all these systems are subsystems of classical logic. This follows, at least partially, from
the fact that, in the Strong Kleene matrices, classical inputs always return the corresponding
classical output (Chemlá, Egré and Spector [10] call this property bivalence-compliance). All
the systems we will consider from here on have this property.
Some people have also studied systems that are impure at some metainferential level (see, for
example, [5], [21] or [3]). For example, the system TS/ST works as follows. A metainference
(Γ1/1∆1), ..., (Γn/1∆n)/2(Σ/1Π) is valid in TS/ST if and only if, for every valuation v, if v
satisfies every Γi/1∆i according to TS, then v satisfies Σ/1Π according to ST; if and only if,
either (i) there is a Γi/1∆i such that v(Γi) ∈ {1, 12} and v(∆i) ∈ {
1
2 , 0}, and/or (ii) v(Σ) ∈ {
1
2 , 0}
or v(Π) = {1, 12}.
With these tools, [5] and [21] develop a hierarchy of metainferential logics based on ST
(and TS). That hierarchy, which contains a system defined at each level n (1 ≤ n < ω), is
such that for every i in the hierarchy, the logic defined at level i recovers every classically valid
metainference of level i or less, but not every classical metainference of higher levels. [5] and
[21] called each logic for level n in the hierarchy, CMn. We chose to call them ST(n), a neutral
option that stresses its link with the inferential ST, which can be understood as the ground
floor of the hierarchy.
Definition 2.8. The ST hierarchy can be recursively defined as follows:
ST(1) = S/1T
TS(1) = T/1S
ST(n) = TS(n− 1) /n ST(n− 1)
TS(n) = ST(n− 1) /n TS(n− 1)
So, for example, ST(2) = (T/1S) /2 (S/1T) (or, more easily, TS/ST). A fully classical
system ST(ω) can be obtained by defining validity such that, for all n, Γ /n ∆ is valid if and
only if it is valid in ST(n) (or equivalently, by taking the union of ST(n) for all n ∈ N).
The following results summarize some of the key results presented in those papers.
Fact 2.9. The General Collapse Result
For every level n (1 ≤ n < ω), a metainference of level n Γ/n∆ is valid in CL if and only
if it is valid in ST(n)
Fact 2.10. For every n (1 ≤ n < ω), ST(n) invalidates infinitely many classically valid metain-
ferences of level n+ 1. (And its metainferences of level n+ 1 are properly included in the n+ 1
classical validities.)4
Fact 2.11. The Absolute General Collapse Result
For every level n (1 ≤ n < ω), a metainference of level n Γ/n∆ is valid in CL if and only
if it is valid in ST(ω).
4Specifically, those logics invalidate higher-level forms of Cut, that the authors labelled as Meta-Cutn.
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One of the most attractive features of ST(ω) is that it not only recovers every classical
metainferential validity of every level (in fact, [21] refers to it as a fully classical logic), but it
also supports a transparent truth predicate (as is also shown in [21], where it is also proved that
each logic in the hierarchy can be safely extended with a transparent truth-predicate).
3 Collapsing (meta)-inferences into formulae
3.1 Translation Functions
As said above, our goal in this paper is to be able to deal with the notion of metainferential
validity by translating metainferences into formulae, in such a way that the translation preserves
(in)validity. To do that, it is useful to begin by examining some existing results in the literature.
There are a number of papers that deal with translating inferences into formulae. For instance,
Barrio et al. [7] define:
τ(Γ/ψ) =
{
(γ1 ∧ ... ∧ γn)→ ψ Γ 6= ∅
ψ otherwise




(¬γ1 ∨ ... ∨ ¬γn) ∨ (δ1 ∨ ... ∨ δn) Γ 6= ∅ and ∆ 6= ∅
(¬γ1 ∨ ... ∨ ¬γn) Γ 6= ∅ and ∆ = ∅
(δ1 ∨ ... ∨ δn) Γ = ∅ and ∆ 6= ∅
Using these translation functions, Barrio, Rosenblatt and Tajer (2015) argued that the logic
ST was LP, since (using the above functions) the valid (n+1)-inferences of ST can be turned ex-
actly into valid n-inferences of LP. In that way, a proof system for the inferences of LP indirectly
gives us a proof system for the metainferences of ST, and a proof system for the metainferences
of LP would indirectly give us a proof system for the metametainferences of ST. However,
LP is not its own metainferential logic. For instance, the metainference (/1φ), (φ/1)/2(/1ψ)
is valid in LP; however, its translation, τ(/1φ), τ(φ/1)/1τ(/1ψ) = φ,¬φ/1ψ is invalid in that
system. Therefore, a proof system for the inferences of LP can be used as a proof system for
the metainferences of ST, but not for its metametainferences.
This divergence between the inferential and metainferential level logics (under standard
translation functions) is part of what allows us to build theories (such as ST) which, for example,
validate all classical inferences, but at the same time can non-trivially incorporate problematic
vocabulary, such as truth predicates. However, this same phenomenon complicates the task of
giving inferential calculi for meta n-level inferences, since it is typically not obvious which n−1
system will preserve (in)validity under a given translation function.
In the following subsection, we show a way to provide translation functions into an extended
language system, which always preserves (in)validity.
3.2 Satisfaction Operators and σ-systems
What we shall do in this section is, given a language L and a system X/Y, construct a language
Lσ and a system X/Yσ, which add satisfaction operators to them. Intuitively, these operators
5The conditional Barrio et al used is a material one. Therefore, it is equivalent to Dicher and Paoli’s when
restricted to single conclusion inferences.
Australasian Journal of Logic (18:7) 2021, Article no. 3
739
will represent (formula) valuation standards. For example, given the set of truth values V =
{1, 12 , 0} and the standards S = {1} and T = {1,
1












Definition 3.1. More generally, given a set of truth values V = {v1, ..., vn} and a standard
X ⊆ V , the operator σX will be defined by:6
v(σX(A)) =
{
1 v(A) ∈ X
0 otherwise
Let X/1Y be the logic defined from the level-1 standard X/1Y (call this logic XY for short),
and σX , σY be the satisfaction operators that represent those standards. We will now define
a system XYσ, on the one hand, and a translation function from the (meta)-inferences of XY
into formulas of XYσ, on the other.
Definition 3.2. The system XYσ is easy to characterize. It contains the same language, truth
values and truth functions as XY, extended with the operators σX and σY . Both the premise
and conclusion standards are equal to {1}; in other words, Γ XYσ ∆ (i.e. the inference from Γ
to ∆ is valid in the system XYσ) if an only if it preserves value 1 from premises to conclusion.7
Definition 3.3. The translation function τXY is defined in the following way:8
τXY(Γ/1∆) =

(σX(γ1) ∧ ... ∧ σX(γi))→ (σY (δ1) ∨ ... ∨ σY (δj)) Γ 6= ∅ and ∆ 6= ∅
¬(σX(γ1) ∧ ... ∧ σX(γi)) Γ 6= ∅ and ∆ = ∅
(σY (δ1) ∨ ... ∨ σY (δj)) Γ = ∅ and ∆ 6= ∅
τXY(Γ/(n>1)∆) =

(τXY(γ1) ∧ ... ∧ τXY(γi))→ (τXY(δ1) ∨ ... ∨ τXY(δj)) Γ 6= ∅ and ∆ 6= ∅
¬(τXY(γ1) ∧ ... ∧ τXY(γi)) Γ 6= ∅ and ∆ = ∅
(τXY(δ1) ∨ ... ∨ τXY(δj)) Γ = ∅ and ∆ 6= ∅
6These operators, then, work as characteristic functions for each standard (in a given valuation), since stan-
dards are sets. We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to our attention.
7As a reviewer points out, the definition as written allows for diagonalization, which would suffice to produce
revenge paradoxes if something like a transparent truth-predicate were part of the language (see Section 5 for
more on this). In that case, something would need to be done in order to avoid triviality. One option might
be to somehow restrict the application of the operators, probably to grounded sentences. But there is another
option available, which is to change the way in which we understand sentential equivalence to be expressed in
the system. Instead of taking two sentences A and B to be equivalent if and only if the sentence A↔ B is true
in every valuation, one could understand equivalence as A↔ B not being false in any valuation (or equivalently,
it being non-false in every valuation). Note that, following this path, two sentences could be equivalent even if
they have different truth values in some (or even all!) valuations. This is the path followed in [1], [6] and [20].
In the first, the authors defined systems with both a transparent truth-predicate and a consistency operator in
a Strong-Kleene setting. In the second, they add a consistency operator to a truth-theory based on ST. In the
third, the author presents two ways to add a validity operator to a transparent truth-theory based on ST.
8Note that we use a conditional, as Gentzen originally did [17], but in the cases we are interested it is possible
to read A→ B as ¬A ∨B, and the definition would look similar to the one given by Dicher and Paoli above
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Notice that this definition is recursive. In particular, in the second clause, the members of
Γ and ∆ can themselves be (n − 1)-inferences. As an illustration, the following inferences and
metainferences of ST would be translated into formulas of STσ as follows:
• τST(A/1B)) = σS(A)→ σT (B)
• τST(A,B/1C,D)) = (σS(A) ∧ σS(B))→ (σT (C) ∨ σT (D))
• τST((/1A), (/1¬A)/2(/1B)) = (τST(/1A)∧τST(/1¬A))→ τST(/1B) = (σT (A)∧σT (¬A))→
σT (B)
• τST((A/1B)/2(C/1D)) = τST(A/1B) → τST(C/1D) = (σS(A) → σT (B)) → (σS(C) →
σT (D))
In the third case, notice that the metainference (/1A), (/1¬A)/2(/1B) is invalid in ST (the
valuation that assigns 12 to A and 0 toB is a counterexample). If we translated this metainference
as Barrio et al. suggest, then we would get the formula (A ∧ ¬A) → B which is valid in ST
(in particular, the valuation above assigns 12 to the formula, which belongs to the conclusion
standard). However, notice that our translation (σT (A) ∧ σT (¬A)) → σT (B) has the same
counterexample than the metainference above, receiving value 0 in that valuation.
With this apparatus in mind, we can now prove the following results.
Theorem 3.4. For every mixed logic X/1Y defined from a level-1 standard X/1Y (call this
logic XY for short), every metainferential level n and every valuation v, if the connectives of
XY behave classically for classical values, then v satisfies an n-inference Γ/n∆ in XY if and
only if v satisfies τXY(Γ/n∆) in XYσ
Proof. We prove this result via an induction on the level of the inference n.
Base step: n = 1. Γ/1∆ is a regular inference, and Γ and ∆ are sets of formulae. Suppose
that Γ/1∆ is satisfied by a valuation v in XY. Therefore, by Definition 2.3, if v satisfies γ1 and
... and v satisfies γi then v satisfies δ1 or ... or v satisfies δj . Thus, by Definitions 3.1 and 3.2,
if v(σX(γ1)) = 1 and ... and v(σX(γi)) = 1 then v(σY (δ1)) = 1 or ... or v(σY (δ1)) = 1. Given
that the connectives of XY (and therefore of XYσ) behave classically for classical values, we
have that v((σX(γ1) ∧ ... ∧ σX(γi)) → (σY (δ1) ∨ ... ∨ σY (δ1))) = 1. Thus, by Definition 3.3,
v(τXY(Γ/1∆)) = 1. And, once again by the definition of satisfaction, we have that τXY(Γ/1∆)
is satisfied in XYσ. The right-to-left direction is identical, read backwards.
Inductive step: n > 1. Γ/n∆ is a meta n-inference, and Γ and ∆ are sets of (n−1)-inferences.
Suppose that Γ/n∆ is satisfied by a valuation v inXY. Therefore (by Definition 2.3), if v satisfies
γ1 and ... and v satisfies γi then v satisfies δ1 or ... or v satisfies δj (all in XY). Since γ1, ..., γi
and δ1, ...δj are inferences of level n − 1, by the inductive hypothesis, we get that if v satisfies
τXY(γ1) and ... and v satisfies τXY(γi) then v satisfies τXY(δ1) or ... or v satisfies τXY(δj) (all
in XYσ). Given that XYσ has {1} as both the premise and conclusion standard, we get that if
v(τXY(γ1)) = 1 and ... and v(τXY(γi)) = 1 then v(τXY(δ1)) = 1 or ... or v(τXY(δ1)) = 1. The
proof then continues in the same way as in the base step.
Corollary 3.1. For every mixed logic X/1Y defined from a level-1 standard X/1Y (call this
logic XY for short) and every metainferential level n, if the connectives of XY behave classically
for classical values and Γ/n∆ is valid in XY, then XYσ τXY(Γ/n∆)
Corollary 3.2. For every mixed logic X/1Y defined from a level-1 standard X/1Y (call this
logic XY for short) and every metainferential level n, if the connectives of XY behave classically
for classical values and Γ/n∆ is anti-valid in XY, then τXY(Γ/n∆) XYσ
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Note that systems obtained from level-1 satisfaction standards will always be pure at every
metainferential level (since "lifting" repeats the standard, see above). The previous definitions
and results can be generalized to mixed logics obtained from standards of a level greater than
1, which can therefore be impure at metainferential levels (e.g. the system TS/ST introduced
in section 2). In order to do that, the base case must be given at the inferential level of the
standard from which the system is obtained.
Definition 3.5. The translation function for a logicX/n>1Y based on an (n > 1)-level standard
(XY for short) is as follows.
τXY(Γ/n∆) =

(τX(γ1) ∧ ... ∧ τX(γi))→ (τY (δ1) ∨ ... ∨ τY (δj)) Γ 6= ∅ and ∆ 6= ∅
¬(τX(γ1) ∨ ... ∨ ¬τX(γi)) Γ 6= ∅ and ∆ = ∅
(τY (δ1) ∨ ... ∨ τY (δj)) Γ = ∅ and ∆ 6= ∅
τXY(Γ/(m>n)∆) =

(τXY(γ1) ∧ ... ∧ τXY(γi))→ (τXY(δ1) ∨ ... ∨ τXY(δj)) Γ 6= ∅ and ∆ 6= ∅
¬(τXY(γ1) ∨ ... ∨ ¬τXY(γi)) Γ 6= ∅ and ∆ = ∅
(τXY(δ1) ∨ ... ∨ τXY(δj)) Γ = ∅ and ∆ 6= ∅
Notice that the first part of the definition is not recursive, since the translation function
references other translation functions, which are different from the one being defined.
Once again, as an illustrative example, consider the logic TS/ST. The first clause of the
base case in the above definition will be given by:
τTS/ST(Γ/2∆) = (τTS(γ1) ∧ ... ∧ τTS(γi))→ (τST(δ1) ∨ ... ∨ τST(δj))
Thus, a level 2 inference such as (A/1B)/2(C/1D) will be translated as:
τTS(A/1B)→ τST(C/1D) = (σT (A)→ σS(B))→ (σS(C)→ σT (D))
As one can readily see, every formula will be evaluated with the correct standard. With all
this in mind, we can generalize the results given above to metainferential many-valued mixed
logics.
Theorem 3.6. For every metainferential mixed logic X/mY defined from an arbitrary m-level
standard (XY for short), every metainferential level n and every valuation v, if the connectives
of XY behave classically for classical values, then v satisfies an n-inference Γ/n∆ in XY if and
only if v satisfies τXY(Γ/n∆) in XYσ.
Proof. We prove this result via an induction on the level m of the standard from which the
system is obtained. For the base step m = 1, the result is given by Theorem 3.4. We need only
prove the inductive step, where m > 1. The inductive hypothesis thus claims that for every
system X/kY (with k < m) and every metainferential level n, v satisfies Γ/n∆ in X/kY if and
only if v satisfies τX/kY(Γ/n∆) in X/kY
σ (call this Inductive Hypothesis 1). We now need to
prove this for a logic defined at level m. We do this via another induction on the level n of the
inference.
Base step: n = m. Note, first that if n < m then Γ/n∆ can be thought of as an m-inference
with empty premises (and empty premises in the conclusion, and so on). Thus, by proving this
result for n = m we prove it for every n < m.
Suppose, then, that v satisfies the inference Γ/n∆ in X/mY. Therefore (by the definition
of satisfaction), if v satisfies γ1 and ... and v satisfies γi (according to the premise standard
X) then v satisfies δ1 or ... or v satisfies δj (according to the conclusion standard Y ). Now,
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since m > 1, both X and Y will be mixed standards, i.e. we can note them as X1/(m−1)X2
and Y1/(m−1)Y2. Thus, by Inductive Hypothesis 1 we get that if v satisfies τX(γ1) and ... and
v satisfies τX(γi) (all in Xσ) then v satisfies τY (δ1) or ... or v satisfies τY (δj) (all in Yσ). This
implies that if v satisfies τX(γ1) and ... and v satisfies τX(γi) then v satisfies τY (δ1) or ... or
v satisfies τY (δj) (all in XYσ). This is so because every τX(φ) is a formula of Xσ, and XYσ
contains the same truth values and connectives than Xσ, and also contains the operator σX .
Therefore, every valuation of a formula in Xσ will have the same value in XYσ. The same goes
for Yσ.
Given that XYσ has {1} as both the premise and conclusion standards, and that the con-
nectives of XY (and therefore of XYσ) behave classically for classical values, we have that
v((τX(γ1) ∧ ... ∧ τX(γi))→ (τY (δ1) ∨ ... ∨ τY (δ1))) = 1.
Thus, by Definition 3.5, we get that v(τXY(Γ/n∆)) = 1, and that Γ/n∆ is satisfied in XYσ.
Inductive step: n > m. The proof is almost identical to the inductive step in Theorem 3.4,
so we omit it here.
Corollary 3.3. For every metainferential mixed logic X/mY defined from an arbitrary m-level
standard (XY for short) and every metainferential level n, if the connectives of XY behave
classically for classical values and Γ/n∆ is valid in XY, then XYσ τXY(Γ/n∆)
Corollary 3.4. For every metainferential mixed logic X/mY defined from an arbitrary m-level
standard (XY for short) and every metainferential level n, if the connectives of XY behave
classically for classical values and Γ/n∆ is anti-valid in XY, then τXY(Γ/n∆) XYσ
In the next section, we show how to build proof-theoretic tools (specifically, sequent calculi)
for σ-systems, which are sound and complete with respect to the semantics presented in this
section. Given that, as we showed, the semantics of these σ-systems preserve the (in)validity of
metainferences of their respective base systems (under translation), providing sound and com-
plete sequent calculi for σ-systems will indirectly give us a proof theory for the metainferences
of those base systems.
4 Proof Theories for σ-systems
In this section, we provide a recipe for generating n-sided sequent calculi for σ-systems, irrespec-
tive of the language, truth values and standards (i.e. σ operators) that they contain. We also
provide an example of a particular system, which allows us determine metainferential validity
for a wide range of known systems.
Before moving on to that, it is worth mentioning that [13] provides a traditional, two-sided
and unlabelled sequent-calculi for every metainferential logic that can be defined through the
notions of strict and tolerant satisfaction, namely, ST, TS, LP and K3. Nevertheless, these
calculi are sound and complete for the global validities of these logics, and not for the local
ones. On the other hand, [12] and [15] provide sound and complete sequent-calculi for the local
validities of these logics. Nevertheless, they use labelled and nested sequent calculi. Our calculi
will be sound and complete with respect to local validities, and will also be unlabelled and not
nested.
Designing unlabelled n-sided sequent calculi for σ-systems (where n is the number of truth
values of the many-valued logic, see below) is straightforward—provided we have an n-sided
sequent calculi for some of the logics without the σ-operators. The key will be to add rules for
each satisfaction operator added to the language, specifying when they receive values 1 and 0,
respectively.
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Let V = {v1, . . . , vn} be the set of truth-values used to specified the logic. Let 0, 1 ∈ V , and
let V be such that for every i ∈ V such that i 6= 0 and i 6= 1, 0 < i < 1. Moreover, let the
order of truth-values in V be partial. Our n sided-sequents will have a disjunctive reading (as
suggested in e.g. [25]).
Definition 4.1. Let Γi (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) be a (finite) set of formulas. A sequent of form
Γ1 | · · · | Γn is satisfied by a valuation v if and only if v(γ1) = v1 for some γ1 ∈ Γ1 or . . . or
v(γn) = vn for some γn ∈ Γn. A sequent is valid if and only if it is satisfied by every valuation.
A valuation is a counterexample to a sequent if the valuation does not satisfy the sequent.
The rules for a σX operator can be given as follows:
Definition 4.2. We need to consider two cases: (i) the cases in which vi ∈ X, and (ii) the cases
where vj /∈ X. The following will thus be the general form for the rules for a σX operator:
Γ1 | · · · | Γi, A | · · · | Γn
Γ1 | · · · | Γi | · · · | Γn, σX(A)
(i)
Γ1 | · · · | Γj , A | · · · | Γn
Γ1, σX(A) | · · · | Γj | · · · | Γn
(ii)
Notice that if the standard X contains more than one truth value, then the formula A will
appear in more than one side in the premise of rule (i), and if V −X contains more than one
truth value, A will appear in more than one side in the premise of rule (ii) (see below for an
example).
Finally, since σ-systems have {1} as both the premise and conclusion standards, we shall say
that
Definition 4.3. Γ ` ∆ if and only if Γ | · · · | Γ | ∆ is provable.
In what follows, we will exemplify these notions with a particular σ-system, namely, the STσ
system. As shown in the previous sections, this system contains the truth values {1, 12 , 0}, and
the σS and σT operators that represent the standards S = {1} and T = {1, 12}, respectively.
Notice that this system is the same as TSσ, LPσ, TS/STσ and of any other either inferential
or metainferential mixed logic that contains those truth values and standards. What will change
in all these cases is the way in which the (meta)inferences are translated into formulae of the
system. But since, as we have already proved in Corollary 3.3, their respective translations all
preserve (in)validity, it will suffice to show that the sequent calculus for STσ (which we will call
LKσ) is sound and complete with its semantics in order to (indirectly) obtain a proof-theory
for the metainferences of all those systems.
According to Definition 4.2, the following would be the four rules of LKσ for the σS and σT
operators.
Definition 4.4. Rules for the σS and σT operators
Γ, A | Σ, A | ∆
Γ, σS(A) | Σ | ∆
LσS
Γ | Σ | ∆, A
Γ | Σ | ∆, σS(A)
RσS
Γ, A | Σ | ∆
Γ, σT (A) | Σ | ∆
LσT
Γ | Σ, A | ∆, A
Γ | Σ | ∆, σT (A)
RσT
As said above, our reading of the sequents will be disjunctive, thus the following will hold in
the three-valued case.
Definition 4.5. A three-sided disjunctive sequent Γ | Σ | ∆ is satisfied by a valuation v if and
only if v(A) = 0 for some A ∈ Γ, or v(B) = 12 for some B ∈ Σ, or v(C) = 1 for some C ∈ ∆.
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The proof system we are about to present includes some axioms and rules, as usual. A
sequent is provable in LKσ if and only if it follows from the axioms by some number (possibly
zero) of applications of the rules. As we will be working with sets, the effects of the structural
rules of Exchange and Contraction are built in, and Weakening is built into the axioms.
We will have three versions of a three-sided Cut rule, and also a Derived Cut rule (that
can be inferred from the three basic rules of Cut)9 and that will also play a key role in the
completeness proof presented below, following [25]. Id is the only axiom-scheme. Cut 1, Cut 2,
Cut 3 and Derived Cut are structural rules, while the rest are operational rules. Given that the
connectives for which we do not give any rules (∨, → and ↔) can be defined in terms of the
ones for which we do provide rules, this succinct presentation is just as good.
A,Γ | A,Σ | A,∆ Id
Γ, A | Σ | ∆ Γ | Σ, A | ∆
Γ | Σ | ∆ Cut1
Γ | Σ | ∆, A Γ | Σ, A | ∆
Γ | Σ | ∆ Cut2
Γ, A | Σ | ∆ Γ | Σ | ∆, A
Γ | Σ | ∆ Cut3
Γ, A | Σ, A | ∆ Γ | Σ, A | ∆, A Γ, A | Σ | ∆, A
Γ | Σ | ∆ Derived Cut
Γ | Σ | ∆, A
Γ,¬A | Σ | ∆ L¬
Γ | Σ, A | ∆
Γ | Σ,¬A | ∆ M¬
Γ, A | Σ | ∆
Γ | Σ | ∆,¬A R¬
Γ, A,B | Σ | ∆
Γ, A ∧B | Σ | ∆ L∧
Γ | Σ | ∆, A Γ | Σ | ∆, B
Γ | Σ | ∆, A ∧B R∧
Γ | Σ, A | ∆, A Γ | Σ, B | ∆, B Γ | Σ, A,B | ∆
Γ | Σ, A ∧B | ∆ M∧
Finally, the following are the main results concerning LKσ.
Theorem 4.6 (Soundness). If a sequent Γ | Σ | ∆ is provable in LKσ, then it is valid in LKσ.
Proof. The axioms are valid, and validity is preserved by the rules, as can be checked without
too much trouble.
Theorem 4.7 (Completeness). If a sequent Γ | Σ | ∆ is valid in LKσ, then it is provable in
LKσ.
Proof. We will use the method of reduction trees,10 which will allow us to build, for any given
sequent, either a proof of that sequent or a counterexample to it. The method also provides of
a way of building the potential counterexample. We will introduce the notions of subsequent
and sequent union, that will be used in the proof:
Definition 4.8. A sequent S = Γ | Σ | ∆ is a subsequent of a sequent S′ = Γ′ | Σ′ | ∆′ (written
S v S′) if and only if Γ v Γ′, Σ v Σ′, and ∆ v ∆′.
Definition 4.9. A sequent S = Γ | Σ | ∆ is the sequent union of a set of sequents [Γi | Σi | ∆i]i∈I
(written S = t[Γi | Σi | ∆i]i∈I) if and only if Γ = ti∈IΓi, Σ = ti∈IΣi and ∆ = ti∈I∆i.
9Derived Cut would require two occurrences of at least two of the premises in order to derive from the given
primitive rules. This will not affect anything in the later proofs, as we are working with sets of premises (and
not multi-sets or sequences).
10For similar proofs, see [25] and [22].
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The construction starts from a root sequent S0 = Γ0 | Σ0 | ∆0, and then builds a tree in
stages, applying at each stage all the operational rules that can be applied, plus Derived Cut
“in reverse”, i.e. from the conclusion sequent to the premise(s) sequent(s). For the proof, we use
an enumeration of the formulae and an enumeration of names. We will reduce, at each stage,
all the formulae in the sequent, starting from the one with the lowest number, then continuing
with the formula with the second lowest number, and moving on in this way until the formula
with the highest number in the sequent is reduced. In the case where a formula appears in more
than one side of the sequent, we will start by reducing the formula that appears on the left side
and then proceed to the middle and the right side, respectively. The final step, at each stage
n of the reduction process, will be an application of the Derived Cut rule to the nth-formula
in the enumeration. If we apply a multi-premise rule, we will generate more branches that will
need to be reduced. If we apply a single-premise rule, we just extend the branch with one more
leaf. We will only add formulae at each stage, without erasing any of them. As a result of the
process just described, every branch will be ordered by the subsequent relation. Any branch
that has an axiom as it topmost sequent will be closed. A branch that is not closed is considered
open. This procedure is repeated until every branch is closed, or until there is an infinite open
branch. If every branch is closed, then the resulting tree itself is a proof of the root sequent. If
there is an infinite open branch Y , we can use it to build a counterexample to the root sequent.
Thus, stage 0 will just be the root sequent S0. If it is an axiom, the branch is closed. For any
stage n+ 1, one of two following things might happen:
1. For all branches in the tree after stage n, if the tip—e.g., the sequent that is being
reduced— is an axiom, the branch is closed.
2. For open branches: For each formula A in a sequent position in each open branch, if A
already occurred in that sequent position in that branch (i.e. A has not been generated
during stage n+ 1), and A has not already been reduced during stage n+ 1, then reduce
A as is shown below. There are three possible positions in which a formula can appear in
a sequent: either (i) on the left side, or (ii) on the middle, or (iii) on the right side. We
need to consider all these possible cases.
• If A is a negation ¬B, then: if A is in the left/middle/right position, extend the branch
by copying its current tip and adding B to the right/middle/left position.
• If A is a conjunction B ∧ C, then: (i) if A is in the left position, extend the branch by
copying its current tip and adding both B and C to the left position. (ii) If A is in the
middle position, split the branch in three: extend the first by copying the current tip and
adding B to both the middle and right positions; extend the second by copying the current
tip and adding C to the middle and right positions; and extend the third by copying the
current tip and adding both B and C to the middle position. (iii) If A is in the right
position, split the branch in two: extend the first by copying the current tip and adding
B to the right position; and extend the second by copying the current tip and adding C
to the right position.
• If A is a formula of form σS(B), then: (i) if A is in the left position, extend the branch
by copying its current tip and adding B to the left and to the middle positions. (ii) If A
is in the right position, extend the branch by copying its current tip and adding B to the
right position. (iii) If A is in the middle position, then do nothing.
• If A is a formula σT (B), then: (i) if A is in the left position, extend the branch by copying
its current tip and adding B to the left position. (ii) If A is in the right position, extend
Australasian Journal of Logic (18:7) 2021, Article no. 3
746
the branch by copying its current tip and adding B to the middle and the right positions.
(iii) If A is in the middle position, then do nothing.
We will also apply the Derived Cut rule at each step. Consider the nth formula in the
enumeration of formulae and call it A. Now extend each open branch using the Derived Cut
rule. For each open branch, if its tip is Γ | Σ | ∆, split it in three and extend the new branches
with the sequent Γ, A | Σ, A | ∆, the sequent Γ, A | Σ | ∆, A, and the sequent Γ | Σ, A | ∆, A,
respectively.
Now we need to repeat this procedure until every branch is closed, or, if that does not
happen, until there is an infinite open branch. If the first scenario is the actual one, then the
tree itself is a proof of the root sequent, because each step will be the result of an application of
a structural or operational rule to the previous steps. If the second scenario is the actual one,
we can use the infinite open branch to build a counterexample.11
If in fact there is an infinite open branch Y , then the Derived Cut rule will have been used
infinitely many times. Thus, every formula will appear at some point in the branch for the first
time, and will remain in every step afterwards. Now, we first collect all sequents of the infinite
open branch Y into one single sequent Sω = Γω | Σω | ∆ω = t {S | S is a sequent of Y }.12
Notice that, as Derived Cut has been applied infinitely many times in the construction of the
branch, every formula will occur in exactly two places in Sω.13 Thus, there will be a valuation
such that no formula in the sequent gets the value associated with the place where it occurs (i.e.
0 if the formula occurs in the left, 12 if it occurs in the middle, 1 if it occurs in the right). Hence,
for each formula A in the sequent, v will give to A a value different from the ones corresponding
to the sides where A appears in the sequent. But that includes all the formulae in the initial
and finite sequent S0. That valuation, then, will also be a counterexample to S0. Therefore
that valuation will be a counterexample to the sequent being considered.
Thus, for atomic formulae A (propositional letters and truth assertions), v(A) = 0 or 12 or
1, respectively, if and only if A does not appear in Γω or Σω or ∆ω, respectively.
The rules for reducing formulae can be used to show by induction, that, if none of the
components of complex formulae receive the value associated with any place in which they
appear in Sω, neither will the compound. We will not see, due to limitations of space, how this
method works in detail. For conjunctions, negations and truth assertions, we proceed exactly as
is shown in [25]. The new cases are that of formulae of the form σS(A) and σT (A). We will just
check that assertions of the form σS(A) can be reduced, because the reduction of σT (A)-type of
assertions is very similar.
11As we have already mentioned, the tip is the sequent that is being reduced. If it is an axiom, then this
branch will be closed. If it is not, then the reduction process will go on. We will present a toy example to
understand exactly what the tip is. Take, for instance, the sequent  | ¬B | ¬A. In this case, this is the tip we
have mentioned. The first step of the reduction will give us the sequent  | B,¬B | ¬A. But this is not an axiom
either. So the reduction process will keep on rolling.  | B,¬B | ¬A is the new tip, and the next step of the
reduction will give us the sequent A | B,¬B | ¬A. Finally, as this sequent is not an axiom either, we will split
this new tip in three when we apply the Derived Cut rule in reverse, and the reduction process will continue.
12As a reviewer noticed, Sω cannot be part of this system because is has infinite formulas. But it is part
of an extended system, LK∞σ based on LKσ , that admits three-sided sequents with infinite formulas, but that
otherwise works exactly as LKσ . In particular, as the definition of satisfaction of a sequent by a valuation does not
(substantially) change, the only relevant difference is that there are many more sequents. The important thing,
regarding the completeness proof, is that any counterexample to an infinite sequent is also a counterexample to
a finite subsequent of it. And those finite subsequents are the sequent of the system we are working with. So,
in particular, a counterexample to Sω (in LK∞σ ) is also a counterexample to S0 (in LKσ), which is the root
sequent we will be working with in this completeness proof.
13It cannot occur in the three places, because then there will be some finite stage n where the formula appears
for the first time in the branch in the three sides. But then that sequent will be an axiom, and therefore the
branch will be closed.
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In the cases of formulae of the form σS(A), no formula like this can appear both on the left
and the right side, because then they would have appeared for the first time in the same leaf of
the branch. When you reduced them at the next stage, you’ll get a sequent with A at the three
sides of the sequent. That sequent will be an axiom, and so will not be part of an infinite open
branch. So (i) either σS(A) is both in the left and the middle sides of the sequent, or (ii) it is
both in the middle and the right side of the sequent.
Let us start with (i). At some point, σS(A) will be reduced. It appears in the middle side of
the sequent, so nothing is supposed to be done when this happens. But it also appears on the
left side. If that happens, then A will appear on the left and on the middle sides of the sequent
on the next stage of the construction. Therefore, A, by inductive hypothesis, will receive value
1, and so will σS(A). Now consider (ii). Once σS(A) is reduced, as it is on the right side of the
sequent, that will get A on right side. At some point, an application of Derived Cut will put A
either on the left or in the middle. In the later, A, by inductive hypothesis, will receive value
0, and so will σS(A). In the former, by inductive hypothesis, A will receive value 12 , and then
σS(A) will get value 0. So, again, σS(A) will not receive a value associated with the sides where
it appears.
By completing the induction along these lines, we can show that we can construct a valuation
such that no formula receives the value associated with any place where it appears in Sω. But,
as we know, that includes all the formulae in the initial and finite sequent S0. That valuation,
then, will also be a counterexample to S0, which is what we were looking for. Thus, for any
sequent S, either it has a proof or it has a counterexample.
5 Some Philosophical Consequences
In this section we examine the status of the σ-systems presented above, and draw some philo-
sophical consequences from our approach. To do that, it will be useful to begin by examining
two possible objections, namely: (i) That the new vocabulary is problematic in self-referential
contexts (i.e. that there are "revenge" paradoxes); (ii) That they are not conservative over their
base systems.
Regarding (i), it is easy to show that, in languages that possess the capacity for self-reference,
some sentences containing the new vocabulary will turn out to be problematic. Let Tr be a
transparent truth predicate—i.e., one such that, for every formula A and valuation v, v(A) =
v(TrpAq). For example, for a mixed system XY, consider the XYσ-sentence λ↔ ¬σY Tr(pλq)
(which states that its own truth is not satisfied by the conclusion standard), and a valuation v.
If v satisfies λ, then λ must receive value 1 (since σ-systems have just {1} as their conclusion
standard). And since, in those systems, the biconditional behaves classically for classical values,
¬σY Tr(pλq) must also receive value 1. Again, since negation behaves classically for classical
values, σY Tr(pλq) will have value 0 and Tr(pλq) will not be satisfied. By transparency, this
means that λ itself will not be satisfied. A similar reasoning applies to the case where one
supposes that λ is not satisfied.
Notice that this objection is especially important for systems of the ST hierarchy, since, as we
mentioned above, one of their proponents’ main goals with them was to get as close to classical
logic as possible while still being able to accommodate problematic vocabulary in self-referential
contexts.
Our response to this objection is that we view the σ-systems as mere instruments for deter-
mining the (in)validity of metainferences. The workflow we assume is that you want to prove
the (in)validity of some metainference in a system XY, you translate the metainference to a
sentence of XYσ, you operate with the apparatus presented above, and then, via Corollary
3.3, and Theorems 4.7 and 4.6 you take back the result to XY. We do not claim there is
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anything philosophically substantial with XYσ itself. Hence, if one wishes to avoid problematic
sentences, it can be useful to restrict applications of the problematic vocabulary to sentences of
the base language.
A similar point applies to objection (ii). Note that inferences such as (A ∧ ¬A)/1B are
invalid in systems like LP. However, since in LPσ both standards are {1} then the inference
will be valid (even for inferences that do not contain the new operators), since no valuation will
satisfy the premises. Hence, LPσ is not conservative over its base language (the same applies to
other systems). Once again, our reply would be that σ-systems are just tools for calculating the
(in)validity of metainferences, and in that light, all we care about is that they are conservative
over the inferences of original base system under translation -which is proved in Corollary 3.3.
Even though we conceive of σ-systems as mere instruments for metainferential validity cal-
culation, they do provide us with other advantages. One key advantage is that they allow us to
present metalogical results in an (extended) object language.
Consider an objection that metainferential mixed systems have received in the literature:
that they are not closed under their own higher-order validities; or put in other words, that they
do not obey the principles they contain. This objection was recently raised by Scambler [28],
Ripley [27] and Porter [23]. A logic contains the principles it accepts—i.e., validates. But, what
is obeying, according to them? The first to talk about this was Chris Scambler (he did not use
the word obedience but rather talked about closure, but the underlying concept is essentially
the same). According to Scambler, a logic “is closed under its own laws” ([28, p. 18])—or obeys
a principle of level α+ 1, as Ripley, and we, prefer to call it—if and only if (i) that principle is
valid in that logic, and (ii) the set of α-inferences is closed under the α+ 1 principle.
Consider, for example, the following instance of Cut without context, and with a 12 -constant
(or a Liar-like sentence) as the Cut-formula:
λ  ,  λ

This metainference is (locally) valid in TS/ST. However, it is true that λ TS/ST and that
TS/ST λ, but not that the empty inference is valid in it. According to those critics, this would
be a case of disobedience, since we have a valid (meta)inference pattern where the premises are
valid but the conclusion is not. This also means that this instance of Cut is not obeyed in ST(ω)
and in every ST(n) with n > 2. What the critics are demanding for an obedient theory is that
if a (meta)principle is valid in the theory, then whenever its premises are valid in the theory,
so are its conclusions. Put more formally, if Γ XY ∆ then (if XY Γ then XY ∆) (for any
metainferential level n). In our example, this seems to not be the case.
We believe the spirit of the critics’ demand is reasonable. However, the precise way in which
they have formulated it is inadequate, for two different and independent reasons. The first
relates to impure metainferential consequence relations, and the second to the global vs. local
criterion of metainferential validity.
Let us begin with the first of these inadequacies. As [8] have argued, the formulation above
does not interpret metainferences, in general, and the above instance of Cut, in particular, as
mixed metainferential theories favour (particularly given that they can be impure at metainfer-
ential levels). In the example above, the right conditional would read as follows: if each premise
of (the instance of) Cut is valid according to ST, then the conclusion is valid according to ST.
Or again, more formally, that if Γ TS/ST ∆ then (if ST Γ, then ST δ) (since the inferences
in the right conditional are of level 1 and thus have to be valid according to the conclusion
standard of TS/ST).
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But this is not how, for example, a supporter of TS/ST (or of ST(ω)) would interpret
this metainference. Supporters of mixed-metainferential theories claim that the standard for
evaluating premises can be different from the standard for evaluating conclusions, which is just
what this way of understanding obedience does not do. Scambler’s Closure demands that if (i)
if Γ is satisfied by a valuation according to TS, then ∆ is satisfied by the valuation in ST, and
(ii) Γ is valid according to ST, then (iii) ∆ is valid in ST. But there is no reason why (iii)
should follow from (i) and (ii).
To reiterate, in a mixed system X/nY, the validity of an (n − 1)-level inference will be
evaluated with the conclusion standard Y . Thus, for spirit of the critics’ demand to be ade-
quately preserved in a mixed metainferential setting, one should not evaluate the premises of an
n-inference Γ/n∆ in X/nY itself, because that would amount to evaluating them in Y/nY. In
contrast, one should read the premises in the same way that one understands the premise part
of Γ XY ∆ (i.e. the premises are satisfied according to X)14
Thus, it would be more appropriate to characterize obedience differently for mixed systems.
The following Mixed Obedience Principle is a more reasonable version of Scambler’s Closure:
if Γ XY ∆ then (if X Γ then Y ∆) (for the metainferential level n at which XY is
defined, the criterion remains identical for inferences of level higher than n)
Here, unlike in Scambler’s version, the n − 1 level inferences in the right conditional will
not both be evaluated with the conclusion standard Y . According to this mixed reading, even
the truth-theory based on ST(ω)—which includes a sentence that gets the non-classical value
in every valuation—obeys its metainferential validities. In the above example, this happens
because it is not true that the premises of that instance of Cut are TS-valid.15
However, we believe that it is not enough to modify the obedience condition as shown above
in order to fully respond to these critics. The second problem with their demand, related to
the criterion of metainferential validity being used, can be introduced as follows. Notice that,
even in the modified principle above, the antecedent (Γ XY ∆) is a claim about the local
validity of a (meta)inference, but its consequent (if X Γ then Y ∆) is the definition of global
validity for that metainference. In other words, the modified principle essentially states that if
a (meta)inference is locally valid then it is globally valid. Now, this does hold, because local
validity is a stronger notion than global validity. But the demand that the principle is making is
still conceptually strange, since it ties two different and independent notions of metainferential
validity, which have no a priori reason to coincide. The notion of obedience is supposed to
characterize the relation between n+1-level and n-level inferences, not between different criteria
of metainferential validity.
Another way to formulate this issue is by discussing a problem related to the one the critics
explicitly mention. So far, we have discussed whether these mixed metainferential logics obey
the principles they contain—or validate. But, do they contain the principles they obey? (i.e.
14Note that, even though we have been using the local metainferential validity criterion in this article, this
particular issue is independent of whether one adopts the global or local criteria. For example, the metainference
(p/p)/2(p/q) is globally valid in TS/ST (because the premise is invalid in TS). However, p/p is valid in TS/ST
(because, as a level-1 inference, it is evaluated with the conclusion standard, ST), and the criterion, as the critics
formulate it, would thus allow us to infer p/q, which is invalid in TS/ST (because it is invalid in ST). Also note
that this case only affects the global reading, since that metainference is locally invalid.
15Some might say that nothing in this new criterion corresponds to the idea that the premises are valid in the
theory, which is true. Thus, we can add that to the criterion, which will now look like this:
if Γ XY ∆ then (if (X Γ and Y Γ) then Y ∆) (for the metainferential level n at which XY is defined, the
criterion remains identical for inferences of level higher than n)
Notice that if Y Γ, then XY Γ.
Australasian Journal of Logic (18:7) 2021, Article no. 3
750
are they closed under principles that they do not validate?).16 This question corresponds to
the conditional that results from switching sides between the antecedent and the consequent
of our previous conditional, like this: in a mixed system XY, Γ XY ∆ if (if X Γ then
Y ∆). The answer to this question is negative. For example, (A/1B)/2(C/1D) is not valid in
TS/ST. Nevertheless, (if TS A/1B, then ST C/1D) is a true conditional statement, since its
antecedent is plainly false, because nothing is valid in TS.
We think a uniform criterion is needed. We should use either the local or the global metain-
ferential criterion everywhere. Note that we are not arguing in favor of neither the global nor
the local criterion. If the reader has independent reasons for choosing one or the other, then
we do not dispute those reasons. All we are arguing for is that, whichever criterion one adopts,
one should use it consistently in formulating one’s meta-requisites. Since our concern in this
article is particularly the local metainferential validity, we reformulate the adequacy condition,
now with a biconditional, as follows (again, we only give it for the level n at which the system
is defined):
For every valuation v, v satisfies Γ/n∆ according to XY if and only if (if v satisfies /nΓ
according to X then v satisfies /n∆ according to Y).
The advantage of our new σ-setting is that it makes it possible to evaluate this whole met-
alinguistic conditional in the extended object language of the σ theory. Provided that XY is
defined from a satisfaction standard of n, this is the conditional we should be checking:
XYσ τXY(Γ/n∆)↔ (τX(/nΓ)→ τY(/n∆))
(Once again, if the level of the metainference is greater than n, then τXY should be used
everywhere). This is not only true in the example above, but it can also be easily proven to be
valid in general from Definition 3.5.
To illustrate all this with the example above, the requisite would read: for every valuation
v, v satisfies (A/1B)/2(C/1D) according to TS/ST if and only if (if v satisfies A/1B according
to TS, then it satisfies C/1D according to ST). And its σ-translation would be:
TS/STσ τTS/ST((A/1B)/2(C/1D))↔ (τTS(A/1B)→ τST(C/1D))
Thus, against what the critics have claimed, once we define obedience in a way that is
appropriate to mixed logics of the kind we study, we can prove (using our σ-apparatus) that
metainferential theories obey the principles they contain and vice-versa.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced a framework that allows one to collapse an n-level metain-
ference (for arbitrary n), belonging to any mixed many-valued metainferential system, into a
formula of an extended-language σ-system. We model-theoretically proved that this translation
preserves (in)validity.
All of this was exemplified with the logics of the ST family, namely, those that contain the
truth values {1, 0, i} and are built around combining the standards S = {1} and T = {1, i}. This
includes the well-studied systems LP, K3, ST and TS, but also other metainferential systems,
such as TS/ST and ST(ω) which have gained some popularity in recent times.
16If we stick to Scambler’s definition, the answer is indisputably yes, because the obedience condition includes
the containment condition. What we are asking is: do metainferential logics validate every principle of level n+1
such that the set of n-validities is closed under it?
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However, the results developed in this paper can be used with other systems, for instance,
systems that contain more than three truth values (such as the logic FDE), systems where the
connectives behave differently with non-classical inputs (e.g. Weak Kleene logic) and systems
that incorporate other vocabulary into the language (such as some LFI systems, see [9]). Note
that all the ST-family systems share a common σ-system (which we called STσ though they
translate their metainferences into it differently), but in all these cases the resulting σ-system
would be different from it.
We have also shown a general way to build sequent calculi for σ-systems, and exemplified
this with a calculus for STσ. Proving soundness and completeness for it indirectly gave us
a calculus for the local metainferential validities of all the logics in the ST-family. This is
important because (other than a few attempts we mentioned above) metainferential logics have
been treated mostly model-theoretically in the literature. Our calculi are very simple to develop
and use since we give a recipe for generating them, and since they are both unlabeled and
non-nested.
In the final section, we responded to some possible objections, namely, that our σ-systems
can introduce revenge paradoxes and that they are non-conservative over their base languages,
by stating that they have only instrumental value. Finally, we showed how, despite this, they
can be useful in the context of philosophical discussions, for instance, on the the “obeying”
objection to mixed metainferential logics in the ST-family. Here σ-systems allow us to prove in
the object language why the adequacy condition posed by critics (and more!), when formulated
correctly, is fulfilled by those systems.
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